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Killing the Goose that Lays the Golden Egg: A Time-Series Analysis of Institutional 
Change and Economic Growth in Hong Kong 
 





This paper examines how the rule of law and democratic accountability have affected 
Hong Kong’s GDP growth rate in the past 20 years. We find that democratic 
accountability has deteriorated substantially since the changeover of sovereignty in 1997, 
while the rule of law has remained strong and stable. Empirical results from ARDL 
bounds tests show a strong positive long-run relationship between growth and democratic 
accountability, and Granger causality tests reveal that democratic accountability causes 
the growth rate of GDP in the short run. These conclusions are robust to controlling for 
the effects of investment and the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  Our results suggest that 
the deterioration in democratic accountability following the handover in 1997 has come 
at the expense of a considerable decline in economic growth, and controverts popular 
arguments in Hong Kong that improving democratic accountability will harm economic 
growth. 
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1.  Introduction 
Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) after its sovereignty 
reverted to China in July 1997. Since then, the Basic Law, which is the SAR’s mini-
constitution, has functioned as the foundation of “one country, two systems” in the SAR. 
It is true that Hong Kong SAR has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy under this 
arrangement, but its sovereignty resides with non-democratic institutions ultimately 
chosen by the central government in Beijing. What are the effects, if any, of the rapid 
change of institutions from a colony to a SAR on the quality of governance in Hong 
Kong? More importantly, has the prosperity of Hong Kong been compromised by such a 
drastic change of its institutions? These are serious questions deserving a formal analysis. 
As one of the Asian tigers, the rapid growth of Hong Kong’s economy during the 
colonial period has been widely documented. With its real GDP per capita of US$26,699 
in 2000, Hong Kong is now one of the five richest economies in the world, surpassing 
even industrialized countries such as Japan, Great Britain and France.
1 The precise 
factors that account for its miraculous growth have been the subject of considerable 
debate. However, a consensus seems to have emerged that a major part of Hong Kong’s 
success is due to its reliance on market-oriented, laissez faire policies and the rule of law 
tradition. Moreover, it has been observed that Hong Kong’s hands-off approach to 
development under colonial rule differed fundamentally from the more interventionist 
strategies adopted by Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. The uniqueness of Hong 
Kong’s past success coupled with its rapid but peaceful institutional change in 1997 
provides a rare opportunity for a case study of the relationship between institutions and 
economic performance. 
Since the changeover of sovereignty in July 1997, a series of government decisions 
and policies appear to have negatively affected the quality of institutions and confidence 
in the SAR. Most noticeably, the plan to introduce the national security legislation, 
Article 23, sparked off a massive but peaceful demonstration on 1 July 2003. Even before 
this huge public display of dissatisfaction with Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa’s 
administration, there were already widespread concerns and discontent with certain 
controversial government decisions. First, decisions by the Hong Kong executive in 1999 
                                                 
1 Figures are taken from real GDP per capita (chain series) in Penn World Table 6.1.   
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and in January 2001 to refer judgments of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal on 
individuals’ right of abode to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
raised serious concerns about the autonomy of the Hong Kong judiciary. Second, in his 
first Policy Address in 1997, Mr. Tung announced a target of supplying 85,000 public 
housing units a year, which has been blamed for the downward spiral of housing prices 
and the protracted economic recession.
2 Third, Mr. Tung was re-appointed by an 800-
strong election committee for a second five-year term as the Chief Executive on 1 July 
2002, despite his consistently poor popularity ratings. Fourth, in April 2004, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress in China ruled out the possibility of 
introducing universal suffrage in electing the Chief Executive in 2007 and the Legislative 
Council in 2008. These were controversial decisions and policies that sparked opposition 
from a large segment of the population.
3 
In the empirical literature, researchers find strong evidence to indicate that 
institutional quality is one of the most important factors of long-run economic growth. 
The protection of property rights, efficiency of the bureaucracy, and effectiveness of the 
rule of law are the most widely-used aspects of institutions that have been found to 
significantly affect the long-run income level or growth rate in cross-country econometric 
studies (see, for example, North and Thomas, 1973; Jones, 1981; North, 1981; Knack and 
Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999). More recent studies have even gone 
beyond correlations to establish causation between the protection of property rights and 
higher income levels (see Acemoglu et al., 2001).  
However, the effects of institutions on growth or income level are less clear when 
institutions are represented by the degree of democracy. Borner et al. (1995) report that 
out of sixteen empirical studies, three find a positive relationship between democracy and 
growth, three find a negative relationship and the remaining ten are inconclusive. 
Helliwell (1994) and Barro (1996), find a non-significant negative effect of democracy 
on growth once several growth-determining variables are held constant. Tavares and 
                                                 
2 See Ho and Wong (2003), who strongly argue that the weakness in Hong Kong’s housing market and 
Hong Kong’s protracted economic downturn after 1997 are homemade rather than imported.  
3 A report prepared by Standard and Poor’s in March 2003 criticizes the inability of the SAR government to 
deal with the worsening structural deficit. It states that Tung’s administration lacks the credibility and 
popular support to implement policies for reducing the increasing fiscal imbalance, and that the future of 
Hong Kong’s credit ratings hinges on whether the SAR executive is able to muster enough political skill to 
reduce the structural fiscal imbalance.  
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Wacziarg (2001) find that democracy fosters growth by improving the accumulation of 
human capital and by lowering income inequality, but hinders growth by reducing the 
rate of physical accumulation and by raising the ratio of government consumption to 
GDP. They find that the net effect of democracy on growth is moderately negative. In 
contrast, Acemoglu et al. (2003) use the constraint on executive power as a measure of 
institutional quality and find that a higher degree of constraint on executive power causes 
a higher level of income, lesser volatile growth and fewer economic crises. 
The question of how democratic institutions ultimately affect growth is still 
unresolved in the empirical literature. What we do know is that there can be a variety of 
channels through which democracy affects growth, including political stability, quality of 
governance, government size, human capital, income equality, trade openness and 
physical capital accumulation.
4 In addition, Rodrik (2000) emphasizes the importance of 
“local knowledge” that allows the market to perform adequately. He argues that 
participatory political systems are the most effective ones for processing and aggregating 
local knowledge. Thus, according to him, democracy is a meta-institution for building 
good institutions, and there is strong evidence to indicate that participatory democracies 
enable higher quality growth.  
The present study contributes to the rich body of literature on growth and democracy 
by looking at the unique situation of Hong Kong, where the recent substantial change in 
institutions provides an ideal case for further study and also one in which we can use 
time-series rather than the more common cross-section or panel approaches. Moreover, 
there is an important unresolved debate in Hong Kong about the effect of the changeover 
on its growth. As a preview of the results, our time-series study finds that democratic 
accountability in Hong Kong has suffered a substantial deterioration since the changeover 
in 1997. The rule of law, however, has remained strong and stable for the past twenty 
years. More importantly, we find strong evidence of a causal relationship between 
democratic accountability and the growth rate of Hong Kong both in the long- and short-
run. The evidence cannot be discounted by the advent of the Asian financial crisis of 
1997 or changes in the investment rate. This paper reaches the conclusion that democratic 
accountability is an important factor determining output growth for Hong Kong both in 
                                                 
4 See Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) for a detailed discussion of these channels.   
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the long- and short-run. Therefore, the widely-accepted contention that democratic 
reforms retard Hong Kong’s growth is unfounded. On the contrary, promoting a faster 
pace of democratic reform is likely to lead to more prosperity. 
The remaining part of this paper is divided into seven sections. In Section Two, we 
describe the dataset, and in Section Three we outline the time-series econometric 
methods used. Section Four presents the results of stationary tests. Sections Five and Six 
present the estimation results of the ARDL bounds tests and Granger causation tests, 
respectively. Robustness checks are conducted in Section Seven. Finally, we conclude 
and summarize in Section Eight. 
 
2.  Data 
This paper argues that Hong Kong’s robust protection of property rights, the rule of 
law, and a market-oriented, laissez-faire approach to governance are the pillars of its 
economic success. To test this, we choose from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) two indexes (the rule of law and democratic accountability) to represent those 
institutional qualities that have traditionally characterized Hong Kong. Moreover, we are 
interested in studying not only those institutional qualities that relate to the protection of 
private property rights such as the rule of law, but also those that relate to political risk 
and stability such as democratic accountability. By selecting both the rule of law and 
democratic accountability, our study of institutional change can encompass the multi-
faceted nature of institutions. 
The rule of law index “reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are 
willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate 
disputes.”
5 The highest score of 6 indicates “sound political institutions, a strong court 
system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power.” The lowest score of 0 
indicates “a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims.” 
Figure 1 shows the rule of law index from the first quarter of 1984, the earliest available 
data from ICRG, to the third quarter of 2003.
6 Hong Kong’s rule of law index remains 
high and relatively constant, fluctuating within a band of 4 to 6. It shows no remarkable 
                                                 
5 From Brief Guide to the Rating System, ICRG, page A-6. (www.ICRGOnline.com) 
6 We aggregate the monthly rule of law and democratic accountability data to quarterly data by taking 
simple averages. This is done because monthly data for GDP are not available.   
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changes even after the reversion of sovereignty in July 1997, which indicates that the 
perception of the impartiality of the legal system in Hong Kong continues to be strong 
and that people continue to be law-abiding and respectful of the court system. Thus, the 
rule of law ratings indicate that institutional quality remains strong in the SAR.  
 
Figure 1: Hong Kong’s Rule of Law 
 



































Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
 
The second index that we selected for measuring institutional quality from ICRG is 
democratic accountability, which measures “how responsive government is to its people, 
on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government will 
fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possible violently in a non-democratic one.” 
The highest score of 5 indicates “free and fair elections for the legislature and executive 
as determined by constitution, viable opposition and independent judiciary.” The lowest 
score of 0 indicates autarchy, as defined by “leadership of the state by a group or single 
person, without being subject to any franchise, either through military might or inherited 
right.”
7 
Hong Kong’s democratic accountability is shown in Figure 2. The series starts in the 
first quarter of 1984, the earliest available observation available from ICRG, and runs to 
the third quarter of 2003, the latest available observation. We observe that the series of 
                                                 
7 From Brief Guide to the Rating System, ICRG, page A-7. (www.ICRGOnline.com)  
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democratic accountability has gone through two distinct troughs over the past 21 years: 
one in 1984-85 and the other in 1997-98. The trough in 1984-85 reflects the sentiments of 
people in Hong Kong at the time of negotiation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. The 
second trough starts in the third quarter of 1997, falling close to 0.5 and remaining at 1 
for the next three years. As discussed above, we argue that the sharp fall in scores of 
democratic accountability results from the increasingly insensitive government decisions 
and policies implemented after the changeover of sovereignty in July 1997. 
 
Figure 2: Hong Kong’s Democratic Accountability 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
 
Figure 3 shows the year-on-year growth rate of Hong Kong’s real GDP. As in the 
series for democratic accountability, there are two distinct troughs in the GDP growth 
series: one in 1985 and another in 1998. One could possibly explain the movement of 
Hong Kong’s GDP growth rate by using traditional macroeconomic variables such as 
investment and exports. For example, the trough in 1985 was caused by a steep export 
slump, and that in 1998 was caused by the Asian financial crisis. However, such 
traditional macroeconomic variables may not tell the whole story. As will be 
demonstrated later in this paper, institutional quality, such as measured by democratic 
accountability, can offer a more convincing explanation of the growth rate in the long 


































































































run. This result seriously questions the validity of the widely accepted belief in a trade-
off between democratic reform and economic growth.  
 
Figure 3: Hong Kong’s Real GDP Growth 
 


























Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics (various issues), Census and Statistics Department, Hong 
Kong SAR.   
 
3.  Econometric Method 
We divide our quantitative analysis into two main parts, addressing long-run and 
short-run questions in turn. Starting with the long run, we adopt the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) bounds test methodology of Pesaran et al. (2001) to test for the 
existence of a long-run relationship among institutional quality and GDP growth using 
Hong Kong data from 1984 to 2003. This technique does not require the researcher to 
assume that the underlying institutional quality and economic growth series are I(0) or 
I(1). In particular, we find difficulty in ascertaining whether the indexes of institutional 
quality are stationary. On the one hand, these indexes can be labeled as stationary 
because they can only take on a limited range of discrete values. On the other hand, they 
clearly exhibit patterns of non-stationarity in formal unit root tests, as will be 
demonstrated later. Thus, using the ARDL bounds test approach is especially appealing  
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in this context to avoid confronting the problem of identifying the order of integration of 
the indexes of institutional quality.  
The ARDL regression yields a test statistic that can be compared to two asymptotic 
critical values. If the test statistic is above the upper critical value, then the null 
hypothesis of no long-run equilibrium relationship between institutional quality and 
economic growth can be rejected regardless of whether the series are integrated of order 
of zero or one. Alternatively, if the test statistic falls below the lower critical value, then 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, again regardless of whether the series are I(0) or 
I(1). If the test statistic falls between the bounds of the two critical values, then the result 
is inconclusive. We expect from the theory that the results will show a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the underlying institutional quality and GDP growth. 
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8 The discussion on ARDL bounds test approach here follows closely the exposition by Atkins and Coe 
(2002).   
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We manipulate the VAR model of (1) to obtain a vector error correction model 
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λ in (4) is the long-run multiplier matrix and is given by  
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where I  is a 2 x 2 identity matrix. As each of the series can be I(0) or I(1), the diagonal 
elements of the λ matrix are left unrestricted. Moreover, we can only test at most one 
long-run relationship under this procedure. Hence, a zero restriction on one of the off-
diagonals of the λ matrix is required. We impose  0 , = P D G IQ  λ , which implies that there is 
no feedback from the level of  t P D G   to  t IQ . Using the terminology of Pesaran et al. 
(2001), institutional quality is long-run forcing for the growth rate of GDP. The 
justification of this assumption comes from the observation that institutional changes in 
Hong Kong originated from Sino-British treaties signed in the last century and were 
influenced by the political climates in Beijing and London before 1997. Economic 
performance was never a crucial factor determining institutional change and reform in  
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Hong Kong. Nevertheless, we can assess the validity of the forcing variable assumption 
by testing for the exclusion of the lagged GDP growth in the institutional quality equation 
of the vector error correction model (VECM) described by (4). We expect that 
institutional quality is long-run forcing for GDP growth. 
Given the assumption of  0 , = P D G IQ  λ  and (3), the equation for the growth rate of GDP 
from the VECM of (4) can be written as: 
 
(7)  t t
q
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j t j IQ
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j
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= . We can interpret (7) as an ARDL(p,  q) 
model, where p is the number of lagged differences of the growth of GDP and q is the 
number of lagged differences of institutional quality as measured by either the rule of law 
or democratic accountability. In practice, p and q do not have to be the same and our 
search for optimal orders of p and q is based on two considerations. The optimal 
ARDL(p, q) model must be parsimonious and it must be free of serial-correlation. 
In (7), the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between the growth rate of 
GDP and institutional quality is  0 : 0 = =σ θ H . We first estimate (7) by OLS and then 
calculate the F-statistic for the null of  0 = =σ θ  against the alternative that  0 ≠ θ  and 
0 ≠ σ . The distribution of the test statistic depends on the order of integration of the two 
underlying series, and Pesaran et al. (2001) provide the critical values for the test statistic 
under the null hypothesis. We accept the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship 
between the growth rate of GDP and institutional quality if the test statistic falls below 
the lower critical value. We reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis if the test statistic exceeds the upper critical value, regardless of whether the 
growth rate of GDP or institutional quality is I(0) or I(1). If the test statistic falls between 
the lower and upper critical values, then the result is inconclusive.  
  12
Under the alternative hypothesis that both  0 ≠ θ  and  0 ≠ σ  in (7), there is a stable 
long-run relationship between the growth rate of GDP and institutional quality, which is 
described by 
 
(8)  t t t IQ P D G ν π π + + = 0  , 
 
where  ,.... 2 , 1 = t ,  () θ µ σ π ∗ ≡ 0 ,  θ σ π − ≡  and  t ν  is a mean-zero stationary process. 
Once (7) is estimated and a long-run stable relationship is detected, we can then use (8) to 
calculate the long-run equilibrium relationship. 
The second part of our analysis examines short-run Granger causation between 
institutional quality and GDP growth. Granger causation tests require that the underlying 
institutional quality and GDP growth series are stationary or, alternatively, that there is a 
long-run equilibrium relationship among them. Using the ARDL bounds test 
methodology in the first part to test for a long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
underlying series will allow us to assess the validity of Granger causation tests. From the 
theory, we expect that institutional quality Granger causes GDP growth in Hong Kong.  
The widely-used Granger (1969) causality test is specified by a bivariate vector 
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where  t x  and  t y  are the growth rate of GDP and institutional quality at time t. The 
bivariate VAR in (9) tests causality by implementing the propositions that 1) the future 
cannot cause the present or the past, 2) an event  x can cause  y only if it occurs before  y , 
and 3) the prediction of  y  can be made more accurate given the occurrence of x. These 
basic intuitions underlie the widely-used Granger causality test.  Formally, x Granger-
causes  y  if the mean square error associated with the prediction of  t y  given the  
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information set  i t I − ,  () i t t I y −
2 σ , is smaller than the mean square error associated with the 
prediction of  t y  given the information set that does not include past  x,  () i t i t t x I y − − −
2 σ . 
In the framework set out above we use an information set consisting of only past  x and 
past  y . Thus, in the first line of (9), if the joint effect of the  i t y −  is significant in 
predicting  t x , then we can say that  y  Granger-causes  x. An F-test with the null 
hypothesis that all of the  i λ  are jointly equal to zero is appropriate in this context. 
Similarly, to test whether x Granger-causes  y , we can conduct an F-test with the null 
hypothesis that all of the  i γ  jointly equal zero in the second line of (9).  In case of a 
rejection resulting from both F-tests in (9), we have a bi-directional causality or a 
feedback relationship between  x and  y . 
 
4.  Tests of Stationarity  
Before discussing the results of our ARDL bounds tests and Granger causality tests, 
we show the results of stationary tests. These preliminary tests are useful to illustrate the 
difficulty in assessing the stationarity of the institutional quality series and, consequently, 
the appropriateness of adopting the ARDL bounds test approach. Table 1 shows the 
results of Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for the 
underlying series of GDP growth, investment growth, rule of law, and democratic 
accountability for the sample period from the first quarter of 1984 to the third quarter of 
2003. As expected, both the growth rates of real GDP and investment generate ADF test 
statistics that are almost all larger in magnitude than their respective critical values for no 
trend and with trend, which leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root in 
these series. However, the same cannot be said for the indexes of the rule of law and 
democratic accountability. Both series generate ADF test statistics that are far smaller in 
magnitude than the critical values in all lags, which leads to a non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root. Thus, there is strong evidence that both the growth rates of GDP 
and investment are stationary, whereas the rule of law and democratic accountability 
appear to be non-stationary in the full sample period.   
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Table 1: Unit root tests for stationarity: GDP growth, investment growth, the rule of law, 
and democratic accountability 
 
Lag  P D G    V N I   
  No Trend  Trend  No Trend  Trend 
DF  -2.7343 -3.3218 -3.3366 -3.7297 
ADF(1)  -3.9268 -4.4849   -2.7954 -3.1898 
ADF(2)  -3.6397 -4.3123 -3.1114 -3.5560 
ADF(3)  -5.0667 -6.2114   -4.5007 -5.1614 
ADF(4)  -3.6616   -4.7413  -3.7178  -4.3978 
ADF(5)  -3.4170 -4.6965 -2.8413 -3.5058 
ADF(6)  -2.5185 -3.6785 -2.5080 -3.1654 
5% C.V.  -2.9017 -3.4721 -2.9017 -3.4721 
 RL  DA 
DF  -1.9762 -1.9472 -1.8960 -1.9388 
ADF(1)  -1.8180 -1.7857 -2.0850 -2.1592 
ADF(2)  -1.8980 -1.8663 -2.1121 -2.1911 
ADF(3)  -2.0673 -2.0390 -2.1725 -2.2582 
ADF(4)  -2.1835 -2.1567 -2.2357 -2.3293 
ADF(5)  -2.1375 -2.1116 -2.6420 -2.7436 
ADF(6)  -2.3925 -2.3713 -2.5477 -2.6698 
5% C.V.  -2.9017 -3.4721 -2.9017 -3.4721 
Note: DF and ADF denote Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller.  P D G   = growth rate of real GDP, 
V N I  = growth rate of real investment, RL = rule of law, DA = democratic accountability. Tests conducted 
for the sample period from 1
st quarter 1984 to 3
rd quarter 2003. 5% C.V. stands for critical value at the 5 
percent significance level.  
 
Based on the ADF test results for the full sample in Table 1, the rule of law and 
democratic accountability appear to be non-stationary. However, when we split the full 
sample and conduct ADF tests for the sub-sample of 1997:3 to 2003:3, the results suggest 
that both the rule of law and democratic accountability are stationary, leading us to 
believe that the two series may be I(0) if we allow a one-time change in the level and/or 
the slope of the trend function of the series.
9 We use the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test of 
stationarity with an endogenous break in level and/or trend to test this. The advantage of 
the Zivot and Andrews test is that it does not require the researcher to assume a break 
point in the series a priori, which is particularly appropriate in our case because various 
possible break dates suggest themselves and it is not clear a priori which is the most 
important. 
                                                 
9 We do not show the ADF test results for the two sub-samples to save space, but they are available upon 
request.   
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Table 2 shows the results of the Zivot and Andrews test. In Panel A, test statistics at 
various lags for a break in mean and a break in mean and trend are larger in magnitude 
than their respective critical values. Thus, the results clearly show that the rule of law 
series is trend-stationary after allowing for a one-time change in the level of the series, as 
well as in the level and the slope of the trend function of the series. The break point 
identified by the test is the fourth quarter of 1993. For the democratic accountability 
series in Panel B, only the test statistics at the fourth lag for a break in mean and a break 
in mean and trend are larger in magnitude than their respective critical values. Thus, there 
is some evidence that the democratic accountability series is trend-stationary after 
allowing for a one-time change in the level of the series, as well as in the level and the 
slope of the trend function of the series. However, such a conclusion is sensitive to the 
number of lags that are included in the test. The break point is estimated to be the third 
quarter of 1997, which coincides with the reversion of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to 
China.  
 
Table 2: Zivot and Andrews (1992) Test for Rule of Law and Democratic Accountability 
Note: 5% C.V. stands for critical value at the 5 percent significance level. 
 
We interpret the results of the stationary tests as suggesting that there is considerable 
uncertainty over whether the rule of law and the democratic accountability series contain 
a unit root, and therefore a degree of uncertainty over whether a long-run equilibrium 
Lag  Break in mean  Break in trend  Break in mean and trend 
 Statistic  Break  Statistic Break  Statistic Break 
Panel A: Rule of Law 
1  -5.372 1993:4 -3.567 1993:3 -5.249  1993:4 
2  -5.356 1993:4 -3.677 1993:3 -5.195  1993:4 
3  -5.398 1993:4 -3.877 1993:3 -5.210  1993:4 
4  -5.425 1993:4 -4.274 1993:3 -5.218  1993:4 
5  -5.596 1993:4 -4.287 1993:3 -5.372  1993:4 
6  -5.777 1993:4 -4.581 1993:3 -5.577  1993:4 
Panel B: Democratic Accountability 
1  -3.983 1997:3 -3.391 1997:3 -4.507  1997:3 
2  -4.150 1997:3 -3.546 1997:3 -4.639  1997:3 
3  -4.447 1997:3 -3.822 1997:3 -4.911  1997:3 
4  -4.862 1997:3 -4.192 1997:3 -5.325  1997:3 
5  -4.553 1997:3 -3.998 1997:3 -4.825  1997:3 
6  -4.286 1997:3 -3.772 1997:3 -4.389  1997:3 
5%  C.V.  -4.80 -4.42 -5.08  
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relationship can exist between the series of institutional quality and the growth rate of 
GDP. We therefore use the ARDL bounds test approach of Pesaran et al. (2001) to assess 
the existence of such a long-run relationship because, in contrast to more traditional 
cointegration tests, this method does not require all of the variables to be integrated of the 
same order. 
 
5.  The ARDL Bounds Test for the Existence of a Long-run Relationship  
The results of the ARDL bounds tests are presented in Table 3. We show the results 
from using the rule of law and democratic accountability as a measure of institutional 
quality in Panels A and B respectively. The results of estimating (7) using the rule of law 
as a measure of institutional quality are shown in the first row of Panel A. They indicate 
that ARDL(6,1) is an appropriate model because it is parsimonious and its error terms are 
not serially correlated, as indicated by the value of the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic 
of 3.745 with a P-value of 0.442. The test for the presence of a long-run relationship 
between the rule of law and the growth rate of GDP results in a F-statistic of 3.005, 
which is below the lower critical value bound of 4.94, thus indicating that the null 
hypothesis of no long-run relationship between the rule of law and growth rate of GDP 
cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. The last column in Table 3 
shows the long-run effect of the forcing variable,  t x , on  t y  as indicated by the calculated 
coefficient, π, of (8). We calculated π to be –0.591 between the rule of law and the 
growth rate of GDP with a P-value of 0.383. As the F-statistic indicates that there is no 
evidence of a long-run relationship between the rule of law and the growth rate of GDP, 
we can ignore its calculated π. 
The results of estimating (7) using democratic accountability as a measure of 
institutional quality are shown in the first row of Panel B. We find that ARDL(3,1) is an 
appropriate model in this case. The value of the
2 χ  statistic of 5.981 indicates that there 
is no evidence of serial correlation, and the F-statistic of 15.677 allows us to 
convincingly reject the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between democratic 
accountability and the growth rate of GDP. Moreover, the calculated π indicates that, on 
average, for every one point increase in the rating of democratic accountability, the 
growth rate of GDP in Hong Kong increases by approximately 1.53 percentage points in  
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the long run. This estimated long-run coefficient is statistically significant at the 4 percent 
level, as indicated by its P-value.  
 
Table 3: ARDL Bounds Test for a Long-run Relationship 
 
Equation 
t y   t x   p  q 
 











































Panel B: Democratic accountability (DA) 
(7) 
 
























Note: The upper and lower critical value bounds for F-statistics are 5.73 and 4.94 for the 5% significance 
level. The P-value for π  is calculated using the delta method.  t y  is the explained variable and  t x  is the 
explanatory variable. p and q are the number of lagged differences of the explained and explanatory 
variables. The 
2 χ  statistic tests for the presence of serial correlation. The F-statistic tests for the presence 
of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the explained and explanatory variables. π  is an estimate of 
the long-run marginal effect of the explanatory variable on the explained variable (see (8)).   
 
In (7), we assume that institutional quality is long-run forcing for the growth of GDP. 
If, instead, we assume that the growth rate of GDP is forcing for institutional quality as in 
(10) below, then can we still detect a long-run relationship between the same two 
variables?  
 
(10)  t t
q
j
j t j IQ
p
j













, 1 1  
 
The estimation results for (10) in Table 3 indicate that there is no evidence of a long-
run relationship between institutional quality and the growth rate of GDP when 
institutional quality is assumed to be forcing for the growth of GDP. For both measures 
of institutional quality, the optimal model is ARDL(1, 1), and both measures show F-
statistics that fall below the lower critical value bound, which leads to the non-rejection  
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of the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between the growth rate of GDP and 
institutional quality. Thus, the results of (10) show strong evidence that the growth rate of 
GDP has little impact on institutional quality as measured by the rule of law or 
democratic accountability in the long run. Our assumption of institutional quality as long-
run forcing for the growth rate of GDP is thus validated.  
Since we argue that one of the main channels through which institutional quality 
affects the growth rate of GDP is investment, we should then observe a long-run 
relationship between institutional quality and the growth rate of investment, as specified 
by (11) below. 
 
(11)  t t
q
j
j t j IQ
p
j












, 1 1   
  
 
The estimation results of (11) in Table 3 show that there is a long-run relationship 
between the growth rate of investment and institutional quality. Both measures of 
institutional quality in Table 3 indicate an optimal model of ARDL(3, 1) with an F-
statistic that is greater than the critical value upper bound at the 5 percent significance 
level, which leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship. It 
should be noted, however, that the long-run relationship between the growth rate of 
investment and the rule of law is degenerate, which is shown by the statistically 
insignificant calculated π for (11) in Panel A of Table 3 (P-value = 0.284). A degenerate 
long-run relationship means that the growth of investment depends on its own lagged 
values and not on the lagged value of the rule of law. However, the long-run relationship 
between the growth rate of investment and democratic accountability is not degenerate, 
because the calculated π is 4.822 with a P-value of 0.004. That is, for every one point 
increase in the rating of democratic accountability, the growth rate of investment, on 
average, increases by roughly 4.8 percentage points in the long-run. 
In sum, this section discusses the ARDL bounds test approach and its application to 
finding a long-run relationship between measures of institutional quality and the growth 
rate of GDP, and between measures of institutional quality and the growth rate of 
investment. We find the existence of a long-run relationship between the growth rate of  
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GDP and democratic accountability, but not between the growth rate of GDP and the rule 
of law. The absence of a relationship between growth and the rule of law might be 
explained by the observation that the rule of law remained very stable over the sample 
period, so that if a relationship does exist it is not discernible in our data set. These results 
were dependent on the assumption that institutional quality is long-run forcing for the 
growth rate of GDP, an assumption which was supported by tests of its validity. We also 
find a long-run relationship between the growth rate of investment and each measure of 
institutional quality, although that for the rule of law is degenerate. Thus, on the whole, 
the evidence is supportive of the claim that the growth rate of GDP in Hong Kong over 
the full sample period depended directly and indirectly on institutional quality as 
measured by democratic accountability.  
 
6.  Granger Causality Tests 
The results of the Granger causality tests are presented in Panel A (for the rule of law) 
and Panel B (for democratic accountability) of Table 4. The columns for m and n give the 
optimal number of lags for the explained and explanatory variables. The choice of 
optimal lags was based on the criteria of parsimony and absence of serial correlation, 
which can be tested by using the 
2 χ  statistic. The F-statistic tests the null hypothesis of 
0 2 1 = = = = n λ λ λ "  or  0 2 1 = = = = m γ γ γ "  in (9). The rejection of the null 
hypothesis based on the F-statistic indicates that the explanatory variable Granger causes 
the explained variable. The last column of Table 4 shows the estimated coefficient of 
1 − t y ,  i λ ˆ , or  1 − t x ,  i γ  , in (9). From these estimated coefficients, we can roughly see the 
magnitude and direction of the causal relationship between the explained and explanatory 
variables.      
First, Panel A indicates that using the rule of law as a measure of institutional quality 
does not give rise to any significant dynamic short-run causal relationship, as indicated 
by the insignificant F-statistics. For example, in Row 1 when the current growth rate of 
GDP is regressed on its own lagged values and the lagged values of the rule of law, the 
F-statistic for testing  0 2 1 = = = = n λ λ λ "  is 0.035 with a P-value of 0.852. Thus, the 
rule of law does not contribute to predicting the growth rate of GDP at all. The second  
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line in Row 1 gives the results when the current rule of law is explained by its own 
lagged values and the lagged values of the growth rate of GDP. Again, we see no 
evidence that the growth rate of GDP contributes to predicting the  r u l e  o f  l a w ,  a s  
reflected by the insignificant F-statistic.    
 








2 χ  
(P-value) 
F-statistic  
(P-value)  i λ ˆ or  i γ 
 
(P-value) 
Panel A: Rule of law (RL) 
GDP growth 
 
RL 7  1  3.977 
(0.409) 
0.035 
















RL 4  1  3.284 
(0.511) 
0.740 





  RL Investment 
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 = 0.000 
(0.460) 
Panel B: Democratic accountability (DA) 
GDP growth 
 
DA 4  2  6.511 
(0.164) 
3.000 
















DA 4  1  6.654 
(0.155) 
6.793 





  DA Investment 
growth 





 = 0.005 
(0.195) 
Note: m and n give the optimal number of lags for the explained and the explanatory variables, the 
2 χ  
statistic tests the presence of serial correlation, and the F-statistic tests the significance of 
0 2 1 = = = = n λ λ λ "  or  0 2 1 = = = = m γ γ γ "  in (9).  i λ ˆ  and  i γ 
 are the estimated coefficients of 
1 − t y  and  1 − t x  in (9).    
 
 
In Row 2 of Table 4, we report the results of tests of the short-run dynamic causal 
relationship between the growth rate of investment and the rule of law. The 
2 χ  statistic 
confirms the absence of serial correlation because the P-values are all larger than 0.05. 
For Row 2, the F-statistics are insignificant, which reflects an absence of causation 
between the rule of law and investment growth in either direction.   
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In Rows 3 and 4 of Table 4 we show the results of dynamic short-run causal 
relationships between the growth rate of GDP and democratic accountability, and 
between the growth rate of investment and democratic accountability. The results in the 
first line of Row 3 show that the growth rate of GDP is significantly predicted by the 
lagged values of democratic accountability at the 5.6 percent level. In the last column, the 
estimated effect of last quarter’s democratic accountability on the current growth rate of 
GDP,  1 ˆ λ , is 1.262 with a marginal significance level of 4.1 percent. Thus, on the average, 
for every one-point increase in the rating of democratic accountability, next quarter’s 
GDP will increase by 1.26 percent. The second line in Row 4 shows the results of using 
the growth rate of GDP to explain democratic accountability. As expected, there is no 
evidence that, even in the short-run, the growth of GDP has any significant effect on 
democratic accountability. 
In Row 4, the results of using democratic accountability to predict the growth of 
investment and vice versa are shown. The F-statistic of 6.793 indicates that democratic 
accountability is a highly significant predictor of the growth of investment. The effect of 
last quarter’s democratic accountability on the current growth rate of investment is 
estimated to be 2.190, which suggests that for every one-point increase in the rating of 
democratic accountability, investment will grow by roughly 2.2 percentage points in the 
current quarter. The estimated effect is statistically significant at the 0.6 percent level. 
Does the growth of investment help increase democratic accountability? The answer is 
no, as indicated by the results in the second line of Row 5. The F-statistic of 0.750 
reflects that the growth rate of investment has no predictive power for democratic 
accountability. 
In sum, the Granger causality tests show that democratic accountability is a good 
predictor of the growth rates of GDP and investment in the short-run. However, none of 
these causal relationships involving democratic accountability are bi-directional, meaning 
that the causality only runs from democratic accountability to either the growth of GDP 
or investment, and not in the opposite direction. Moreover, tests in this section show no 
significant dynamic causal relationships involving the rule of law. 
 
7.  Robustness Tests  
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We have so far addressed the existence of long- and short-run causal relationships 
between the growth rate of GDP and institutional quality. However, in a more realistic 
setting, the growth rate of GDP is affected not only by institutional quality, but also by 
other important macroeconomic variables. The literature on institutions and growth 
suggests that an important additional macro variable is investment. Therefore, we check 
whether there is a long-run equilibrium relationship among institutional quality, the 
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(12) assumes that both institutional quality and the growth rate of investment are long-run 
forcing for the growth rate of GDP. It allows institutional quality to affect the growth rate 
of GDP directly through efficiency and indirectly through the channel of investment 
growth in physical capital. In this section, we drop the use of rule of law as a measure of 
institutional quality and use only democratic accountability in the robustness checks 
because we could not detect long- and short-run causal relationships between the rule of 
law and the growth rate of GDP in previous analysis.  
The ARDL bounds test results that are shown in Panel A of Table 5 confirm that there 
is a long-run relationship among the growth rate of GDP, democratic accountability, and 
investment growth. Moreover, the relationship is not degenerate because the calculated 
π is highly significant with a P-value of 0.043. Thus, the growth rate of GDP depends 
not only on its own lagged values, but also on the lagged values of democratic 
accountability even after controlling for the effect of the growth of investment on the 
growth of GDP. This finding indicates that, in addition to its indirect effect through 
investment, democratic accountability has an independent effect on the growth rate of 
GDP in Hong Kong. 
 
Table 5: Robustness Checks for the Effects of Investment Growth and the Asian 
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(0.328) 





































D ρ  = -2.1827  
(0.211) 
Note: Institutional quality is measured by democratic accountability (DA). DAFC is a dummy with a value 
of 1 for the last quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998, and 0 otherwise. p is the number of lagged 
differences of the explained variable and q and n are the numbers of lagged differences of the explanatory 
variables as listed in Column 2. The 
2 χ  statistic tests for the presence of serial correlation. The F-statistic 
tests for the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the explained and explanatory 
variables, and  π  gives an estimate of the long-run margin effect of DA on the explained variable.  i λ ˆ  and 
i γ 
 are the estimated coefficients of  1 − t y  and  1 − t x  in (9).  D ρ  is the estimated coefficient for the dummy 
DAFC. The upper and lower critical value bounds for the F-statistic are 4.85 and 3.79 for the 5% 
significance level. The P-value for π  is calculated using the delta method. 
 
 
We report the results of the Granger causality test for GDP growth using democratic 
accountability and investment growth as explanatory variables in Panel B, Table 5. Here, 
we intend to check whether the short-run causal relationship between GDP growth and 
democratic accountability still holds if we control for the effect of investment growth. 
The results in the first row of Panel B, Table 5, show that democratic accountability, in 
the presence of the growth rate of investment, is a highly significant predictor of the 
growth rate of GDP, as shown by the F-statistic of 10.477 or P-value of 0.002. It is also 
estimated that for every one-point increase in the rating of last quarter’s democratic 
accountability, the growth rate of GDP increases by 1.14 percentage points in the 
presence of the growth rate of investment. The second row of Panel B presents results in 
the opposite direction: democratic accountability is explained by the growth rate of GDP  
  24
in the presence of the growth of investment. The results, as expected, show no sign of a 
feedback relationship running from the growth rate of GDP to democratic accountability. 
We now consider the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the Hong Kong 
economy, which some critics believe explains the economic downturn and recession after 
the institutional changeover in July 1997. On October 23, 1997, the Hong Kong dollar 
came under speculative attack, but Hong Kong maintained its currency link with the US 
dollar at 7.75 HKD/USD. This brought about a sudden and substantial loss of 
competitiveness in relation to its neighbors in competing goods and services, and put 
considerable downward pressure on the rate of GDP growth.
10 It is possible that it was 
this shock rather than changes in democratic accountability that explains the subsequent 
slowdown in economic activity. We address this issue by controlling for the onset of the 
Asian financial crisis in our analysis of the growth/institutional quality relationship. A 
dummy variable, DAFC, which takes the value of 1 for the last quarter of 1997 and the 
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The results of estimating the extended model of (13) are shown in the first row of 
Panel C, Table 5. We see that DAFC has an expected negative sign in the growth 
equation, although it is only marginally significant ( D ρ   = -1.764 with a P-value = 0.082). 
Moreover, and most importantly, we see that when the Asian financial crisis dummy is 
added to the model, democratic accountability still has a stable long-run relationship with 
the growth rate of GDP (F-statistic = 15.805 with a P-value = 0.000). We also see that the 
estimated long-run marginal effect of democratic accountability on GDP growth, π , is 
not substantially reduced by the introduction of the Asian financial crisis control variable 
(from 1.525 to 1.250). Thus, although the Asian financial crisis negatively affected the 
growth rate of GDP, it cannot explain away the stable long-run relationship between the 
                                                 
10 See Groenewold and Tang (2004) for a discussion of the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the 
newly industrializing economies of Asia.   
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growth rate of GDP and democratic accountability and the negative effects of the 
institutional change in 1997 on Hong Kong’s growth rate.  
The results in the second row of Panel C of Table 5 show that the long-run 
relationship between democratic accountability and the growth rate of investment 
remains relatively unchanged despite adding the DAFC dummy (F-statistic = 13.150 with 
a P-value = 0.000). This reflects the fact that the onset of the Asian financial crisis had 
little effect on the growth of investment, as also shown by the insignificant estimate of 
DAFC of –0.368 (with a P-value of 0.940) and the negligible change in the long-run 
marginal effect of investment coefficient (π  changes from 4.822 to 4.800). Finally, if we 
add the dummy variable DAFC with the growth rate of investment and democratic 
accountability to explain the growth rate of GDP in the last row of Panel C, the long-run 
relationship again survives the control for the effects of the onset of Asian financial 
crisis. The effect of democratic accountability on the growth rate of GDP is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level (F-statistic = 6.293 with a P-value of 0.001). The dummy 
variable DAFC that represents the effects of the onset of Asian financial crisis is again 
insignificant ( D ρ   = –2.1827 with a P-value = 0.211). 
The robustness tests strongly confirm that institutional quality as measured by 
democratic accountability has a stable long-run relationship with the growth rate of GDP 
and the growth rate of investment. The test results show that we can observe stable long- 
and short-run causal relationships between the two series even after accounting for the 
effects of important macroeconomic variables such as investment growth and temporary 
events such as the Asian financial crisis. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
This paper empirically investigates how changes in institutions in Hong Kong over 
the past two decades, and in particular since the changeover of sovereignty in 1997, have 
affected Hong Kong’s economic growth. A number of government policies, including the 
proposed national security law, the referral of judgments of the Hong Kong Court of 
Final Appeal to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the decision 
to supply 85,000 public housing units a year, and the rejection of universal suffrage in 
2008 for the legislative council and the chief executive by the Standing Committee of the  
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National People’s Congress, have all reduced the responsiveness of the Hong Kong SAR 
government to its people, as reflected by its worsening rating of democratic 
accountability. In contrast to democratic accountability, the rule of law in Hong Kong has 
remained strong and stable over the course of institutional change.  
Our empirical evidence shows a significant stable long-run relationship between 
democratic accountability and the growth rate of GDP for the sample period from 1984 to 
2003. Using the ARDL bounds test approach, we establish that institutional quality, as 
measured by democratic accountability, is a statistically significant contributor to Hong 
Kong’s real GDP growth and real investment growth. Thus, among other things, both real 
GDP growth and investment growth depend on the development of democratic 
accountability in the long run. Moreover, Granger causality tests reveal that democratic 
accountability Granger causes real GDP growth and investment growth in Hong Kong in 
the short run. This finding adds further weight to the argument that democratic 
accountability is important for economic growth in Hong Kong not only in the long run, 
but also in the short run.  
We do not detect a stable long-run relationship between the rule of law and the real 
growth rates of GDP and investment in Hong Kong. We explain this result by noting that 
Hong Kong’s rule of law has remained remarkably strong and stable over the sample 
period, as illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, it is not possible to account for the variations in 
GDP and investment growth rates using a series that is close to invariant through time. 
Another finding that deserves mention here is that the stable long-run relationship 
between democratic accountability and the growth rates of GDP and investment is uni-
directional. That is, we detect a stable long-run relationship only when we assume that 
democratic accountability is the long-run forcing variable for the growth rates of GDP 
and investment. The same holds true for the Granger causation tests: the direction of 
causation runs only from democratic accountability to the growth rates of GDP and 
investment, and not the other way. Thus, there is no evidence to support the argument 
that higher growth rates of GDP and investment in Hong Kong in the sample period 
influenced the development of democratic accountability. 
We subject our empirical results to robust testing using variables that control for the 
effects of investment growth and the onset of Asian financial crisis. We find that  
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democratic accountability has an independent effect on GDP growth in addition to its 
indirect effect through the investment channel. We also find that controlling for the onset 
of the Asian financial crisis has little effect on our results. The crisis, which hit Hong 
Kong in October 1997, cannot completely explain Hong Kong’s protracted economic 
downturn in recent years. The results suggest that what is driving the long-run 
relationship between democratic accountability and the growth rates of GDP or 
investment is relatively unaffected by temporary events such as the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. 
The policy implications of our findings are clear. Institutional change in 1997 has had 
a negative effect on democratic accountability in Hong Kong, which in turn directly or 
indirectly slows down the growth rate of GDP. It is not the Asian financial crisis, but the 
worsening democratic accountability and investment climate that should be blamed for 
most of the Hong Kong’s experience of prolonged economic downturn. Moreover, the 
results of this paper imply that policy makers should not view improving democratic 
accountability as involving a cost in terms of lower economic growth, as has been argued 
in the Hong Kong press. On the contrary, improving democratic accountability is a 
source of faster growth of GDP and investment both in the long and short run, and any 
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